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Empirical Tests of Intransitivity Predicted by 
Models of Risky Choice
Abstract
Recently proposed models of risky choice imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference. 
Five studies explored whether people show patterns of intransitivity predicted by four descriptive 
models.  To distinguish “true” violations from those produced by “error,” a model was fit in which 
each choice can have a different error rate and each person can have a different pattern of true 
preferences that need not be transitive.  Error rate for a choice is estimated from preference reversals 
between repeated presentations of the same choice.  Results of five studies showed that very few 
people repeated intransitive patterns. We can retain the hypothesis that transitivity best describes the 
data of the vast majority of participants.
Key words: decision making, errors, gambling effect, reference points, regret, transitivity
JEL classification: C91, D813
1 Introduction
The most popular theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty assume that people 
compute values (or “utilities”) for the alternatives and choose (or at least, tend to choose) the 
alternative with the highest value.  This class of models includes expected utility theory (EU), 
cumulative prospect theory (CPT), prospective reference theory (PRT), transfer of attention exchange 
(TAX), gains decomposition utility (GDU) and many others (Luce, 2000; Marley & Luce, 2005; 
Starmer, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wu, Zhang, & Gonzalez, 2004; Viscusi, 1989). 
Although these models can be compared by means of special experiments testing properties that 
distinguish them (Birnbaum, 1999; 2004a; 2004b; 2005a; 2005b), they all share in common the 
property of transitivity. 
Transitivity is the property that if a person prefers alternative A to B, and B to C, then that 
person should prefer A to C.  If a person systematically violates this property, it should be possible to 
turn that person into a “money pump” if the person were willing to pay a little to get A rather than B, 
something to get B rather than C, something to get C rather than A and so on, ad infinitum. Most 
theoreticians, but not all (Fishburn, 1991; 1992; Bordley & Hazen, 1991), conclude that it would not 
be rational to violate transitivity.
Despite such seemingly “irrational” implications of violating transitivity, some descriptive 
theories imply that people can in certain circumstances be induced to violate it.  Models that violate 
transitivity include the lexicographic semi-order (Tversky, 1969; see also Leland, 1994), the additive 
difference model [including regret theory of Loomes & Sugden (1982) and Fishburn’s (1982) Skew-
symmetric bilinear utility], Bordley’s (1992) expectations-based Bayesian variant of Viscusi’s PRT 
model, the priority heuristic model (Brandstaetter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006), context-dependent 
model of the gambling effect (CDG, Bleichrodt & Schmidt, 2002) and context- and reference- 
dependent utility (CRU, Bleichrodt & Schmidt, 2005).  4
If one could show that people systematically violate transitivity, it means that the first class of 
models must be either rejected or modified to allow such effects.  Models that can violate transitivity 
provide a basis for designing experiments to test transitivity.  These studies will explore violations 
predicted by additive difference models such as regret theory and by the models of Bleichrodt & 
Schmidt (2002, 2005).
A number of previous studies attempted to test transitivity (Birnbaum, Patton, & Lott, 1999; 
Loomes, Starmer, & Sugden, 1989, 1991; Loomes & Taylor, 1992; Humphrey, 2001; Starmer, 1999; 
Starmer & Sugden, 1998; Tversky, 1969).  However, these studies remain controversial; there is not 
yet consensus that there are situations that produce substantial violations of transitivity (Luce, 2000; 
Iverson & Falmagne, 1985; Iverson, Myung, & Karabatsos, 2006; Regenwetter & Stober, 2006, 
Sopher & Gigliotti, 1993; Stevenson, Busemeyer, & Naylor, 1991).  Among others, a problem that has 
frustrated previous research has been the issue of deciding whether an observed pattern represents 
“true violations” of transitivity or might be due instead to “random errors.”
The purpose of this paper is to empirically test patterns of intransitivity that are predicted by 
intransitive models, using an “error” model that has the promise to be neutral with respect to the issue 
of transitivity and which seems plausible as a description of the variability of repeated choices. For the 
lotteries in Studies 1-3, CDG and CRU models make the same pattern of predicted violation given 
parameters chosen to describe well-known phenomena in risky decision making. In Studies 4 and 5, 
we investigate intransitivity predicted by additive difference models, including regret theory and 
majority choice, which make opposite predictions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes CDG and CRU 
models and shows their predicted pattern of violation of transitivity; section 3 describes the error 
model; section 4 describes Studies 1, 2, and 3; the fifth section presents results of three studies, which 
show that transitive models can be retained for these data. The sixth section presents predictions of 5
regret theory and majority rule, the seventh and eighth sections present methods and results of Studies 
4 and 5, and the ninth concludes that despite powerful tests, we do not find evidence of systematic 
violation where predicted by the four descriptive models tested.  Whereas the models and choices of 
the first three studies involve risky gambles formatted without states of the world, the models and 
choices of the last two studies involve gambles defined on states of the world.
2 Theoretical Predictions of CDG and CRU
The experimental design of Studies 1-3 involves variations of three lotteries shown in Table 1, where 
p and q are probabilities, and a > b > c are monetary consequences. In the terminology of the 
preference reversal literature, A is the “$-bet,” B is the “p-bet,” and C is cash.
Insert Table 1 about here.
It will be shown below that CDG and CRU models both imply the intransitive pattern, 
 and   Bordley’s (1992, p. 135) intransitive variant of PRT implies the opposite 
intransitive pattern,    B f A,    A f C, and    C f B. 
Before presenting the models, let us introduce some notation. Lotteries are denoted by capital 
letters A, B, C; X is the set of all pure consequences with elements of X being denoted by a, b, c. 
Formally, an element of X is a lottery that yields one consequence with a probability of one. 
Probabilities are denoted by p and q, so p(a) is the probability of consequence a in lottery A.  
(i) The Context-Dependent Model of the Gambling Effect(CDG)
CDG presupposes that the decision maker employs a different cognitive process when choosing 
between two risky lotteries from that used when choosing between a risky lottery and a sure 
consequence. In the latter case, it is assumed that people are more risk averse because the sure 
outcome makes the risk involved in the risky lottery more salient. CDG postulates two distinct utility 
functions, u and v, such that6
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The hypothesis that subjects are more risk averse when choosing between a risky and a riskless lottery 
implies that v is a concave transformation of u. In contrast with other models of the gambling effect by 
Fishburn (1980), Schmidt (1998) and Diecidue, Schmidt & Wakker (2003), CDG does not imply 
violations of first-order stochastic dominance but it does allow violations of transitivity.
The lotteries in Table 1 can violate transitivity under CDG. When choosing between A and B 
the utility function u is employed while the choices between A and C and B and C are determined by 
the utility function v. Suppose B  A according to the utility function u. Assuming v is more concave 
than u, we can not have A C and C B under v. This means the cycle implied by regret theory and 
Bordley’s (1992) model is ruled out under CDG (See Section 6).  Now suppose instead that A B 
according to utility function u. Again, v is more concave than u so we can have B C and C A 
which shows that the opposite intransitive cycle is admissible under CDG. 
(ii) Context- and Reference-Dependent Utility (CRU)
CRU is based upon Sugden’s (2003) model of subjective expected utility with state-dependent 
reference point.  Reference points had been discussed by Markowitz (1952), Edwards (1954) and in 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979), in order to accommodate evidence that behavior of subjects is driven by 
gains and losses relative to a reference point and not by final wealth positions as in expected utility 
theory. Suppose there are n states of the world and let ai be the consequence of lottery (or act) A in 
state i. The (subjective) probability of state i is denoted by pi.  Moreover, there is a reference point ri 
for every state i. The utility of lottery A in Sugden´s model is now given by




where V(A) represents the context- and reference- dependent utility of gamble A. The reference point 7
in prospect theory was taken as equal to initial wealth. Sugden´s model generalizes prospect theory by 
allowing the reference point to be state-dependent.  In contrast to prospect theory, however, there is no 
probability weighting. This latter distinction limits the descriptive power of Sugden´s model since it 
cannot explain the typical Allais paradoxes. 
CRU generalizes Sugden´s model by allowing the reference point to be context-dependent, by 
which is meant that the reference point may differ in different choices. More formally, we have
  
A f BÛ piu[a i,r i
i=1
n




This is the most general expression of CRU, where ri(A, B) is the reference level for state i in this 
choice. Special forms can be obtained by specific hypotheses on functional forms of the utility 
function and on how reference point depends on the choice situation. The hypothesis put forward by 
Bleichrodt & Schmidt (2005) and pursued in this paper is that when the initial endowment is zero, the 
reference point is the maximum of the lowest consequences of the two gambles in a choice. Assuming 
that utility depends on the difference between consequence and reference point, we have 
  Bleichrodt & Schmidt (2005) showed that with this 
specification, CRU can explain many classic deviations from expected utility such as Allais paradoxes, 
preference reversals, and the disparity between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept. 
For the lotteries in Table 1 we have under CRU A   B as in expected utility theory if pu(a) > 
(p + q)u(b). However, for the choices between B and C and A and C the maximum of minimal 
outcomes is c; therefore, B   C Û (p + q)u(b – c) + (1 – p  – q)u(–c) > 0 and C   A Û0 > pu(a – 
c) + (1 – p)u(–c).  
(iii) Numerical Predictions
In our first series, A = ($100, 0.5; $0), B = ($50, 0.9; $0), and C = $37 for sure.  The cycle A   
B, B  C, and C  A is implied by both CDG and CRU, given plausible values of the parameters for 8
these models. 
For the special case of CDG given by u(a) = a
a  and v(a) = a
bthe cycle is implied when a > 
0.64 and 0.47 < b < 0.6, which are compatible with previously published results.  For instance, in the 
standard common ratio effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), it has been found that ($3000, 1) 
($4000, 0.8; $0) and ($4000, 0.2; $0)  ($3000, 0.25; $0); this result is implied by CDG when a > 
0.78 and b  < 0.78.









î  ï     (4)
Assuming l = 2.2, the same intransitive cycle is implied if 0.64 < a  < 1.04.  These parameters 
are also realistic given previous data (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992); the above-mentioned common 
ratio effect is predicted by CRU for l = 2.2 when a > 0.78.
3 Transitivity and Error Models
Testing transitivity with fallible data has been a controversial topic in psychology (Tversky, 
1969; Iverson & Falmagne, 1985; Iverson, Myung & Karabatsos, 2005; Brandstaetter, et al., 2006; 
Regenwetter & Stober, 2006).  In the economics literature, a similar debate has occurred concerning 
whether phenomena predicted by regret theory, such as predicted violations of transitivity, are “true” 
or can be attributed instead to noise or “error” (Humphrey, 2001; Loomes, Starmer, & Sugden, 1991; 
Sopher & Gigliotti, 1993; Starmer & Sugden, 1998; Starmer, 1999).  Different models of error have 
been discussed by Birnbaum (2004b; 2006), Carbone and Hey (2000), Harless and Camerer (1994), 
Hey (2005), Hey and Orme (1994), Luce (1959; 1994), Sopher and Gigliotti (1993), Thurstone (1927), 
and others.
Because we plan to test transitivity, we think it best to use a choice model that is neutral with 
respect to transitivity.  Models of Thurstone (1927), Luce, (1959), Busemeyer & Townsend (1993), 9
Hey and Orme (1994) implicitly assume or imply transitivity in the absence of error.  Our approach is 
described by Birnbaum (2006), and is similar to that of Harless & Camerer (1994) and Sopher & 
Gigliotti (1993). Whereas Harless & Camerer (1994) assumed that matched choices have the same 
error probability, Sopher & Gigliotti allowed the error rates in different choices to be unequal. 
Birnbaum’s (2006) improvement over those papers is to use repeated presentations of the same choice 
in order to estimate error rates for different choices.  The advantage of this approach is that the error 
terms are not constructed to conveniently “explain away” violations of transitivity, but are estimated 
by a method that is neutral with respect to the issue under investigation. 
Consider a choice between A and B that is presented twice to the same participants.  Some 
people will choose A both times, some will choose B both times, some will switch from A to B and 
some switch from B to A.  The probability of switching from A to B is given as follows:
P(AB) = p(1- e)e+ (1- p)(1- e)e = e(1- e) (5)
where p is the probability that a person “truly” prefers A over B and e is the error rate for this choice. 
Those people who truly prefer A over B have correctly reported their preference the first time and 
made an error the second time, whereas those who “truly” prefer B have also made one error and one 
correct response.  Notice that this model implies that the probability of switching from A to B equals 
the probability of switching from B to A, and that this value is independent of p.
When there are three gambles A, B, and C, there are eight possible response patterns for paired 
choices, shown in Table 2.  We assume that each person can have a different “true” preference pattern, 
which may or may not be transitive, as listed in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here.
The probability of exhibiting the intransitive pattern 000 is as follows:10
P(000)= p000(1- e1)(1- e2)(1- e3) + p001(1- e1)(1- e2)e3 +
p 010(1- e1)e2(1- e3)+ p011(1- e1)e2e3 +
p 100e1(1- e2)(1- e3) + p 101e1(1- e2)e3 +
p 110e1e2(1- e3)+ p 111e1e2e3
(6)
where P(000) is the probability of the observed intransitive pattern in the data; p000 is the probability 
that a person has 000 as her “true” pattern; and e1, e2, and e3 are the probabilities of making an 
“error” in expressing preference on the three respective choices, which are assumed to fall between 
zero and one-half. There are seven other equations like the above for the other seven observed 
patterns.
With two replications, there are 64 possible response patterns (8 X 8), and the equations (as in 
Expression 6) can be expanded to allow for up to six errors or correct reports. This study uses two 
types of replications: the same choice can be presented in exactly the same way, or it can be presented 
with the positions of the two gambles counterbalanced.  Taken together, there are four repetitions of 
each choice, which allow estimation of the error terms.
This “true and error” model with replications is neutral with respect to the issue of transitivity. 
The transitive model is a special case of this model in which parameters representing true probabilities 
of intransitivity are fixed to zero; i.e.,  .  We can test transitivity by comparing the fit of 
the transitive model to a more general model in which all parameters are free.  
To illustrate how this model produces asymmetry of intransitive patterns, consider the 
following hypothetical case in which there are 100 identical participants, each of whom has the “true” 
preference pattern 001 (i.e.,    A f Bf C), and e1 = e2 = e3 = 0.2.  If each participant made each choice 
once, this model implies that 12.8%, 51.2%, 3.2%, 12.8%, 3.2%, 12.8%, 0.8%, and 3.2% would 
exhibit response patterns 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, and 111, respectively.  Note that there are 
four times as many intransitive patterns of type 000 than of type 111 (12.8% versus 3.2%).  If the error 
terms were reduced to 0.1, the overall rate of intransitivity is reduced, but the asymmetry ratio is 11
increased to 9:1.  Intuitively, the reason this model produces asymmetry is that the 000 pattern requires 
only one “error”, whereas the 111 pattern requires two “errors” from the “true” pattern of 001.
This example also illustrates the advantages of using replications.  Of the response patterns in a 
single replication, the model implies that only 51.2% of the observed patterns are the “true” pattern. In 
a two-replication experiment, however, of those cases where a pattern is repeated, true patterns 
account for 83.4% of replicated patterns.  Intuitively, because “errors” are less likely than correct 
reports, repetitions of a given response pattern can be treated as more likely “true” than single 
occurrences of that pattern.
We also analyze the data with respect to a still more general model in which each participant 
has a different “true” pattern of preference and each participant is also allowed different errors rates on 
different choices.  Because each participant makes each choice four times (twice for each presentation 
order), we can summarize the data for the ith participant as (ni1,ni2,ni3), where, ni1, ni2 , and ni3 are the 
number of times (out of four) that this participant chose    A f B,    B f C, and    C f A on these three 
choices, respectively.  We can express the likelihood of these data, given the hypothesis that the “true” 
pattern is 000 as follows:







where ei1, ei2, and ei3 are the estimated error rates for person i on these choices, respectively.  There 
are eight such expressions for eight hypotheses (   H1 = 000, H2 = 001,K , H8 = 111), and each can be 
used to compute error rates to maximize the likelihood.  These eight maximum likelihood calculations 
can be made for each participant and the hypothesis chosen that has the highest Bayesian posterior 








where P(Hk) are the prior probabilities of the eight hypotheses, and Bi(Hk | ni1,ni2,ni3) is the posterior 12
probabilities of the kth hypothesis for the ith participant, given his or her observed data.  The prior 
probabilities for eight hypotheses can be initially set to be uniform, and can then “bootstrapped” from 
the sum of maximum likelihood for each hypothesis, summed over participants.  
Equation 7 shows that even if each participant has a different error rate for each choice, 
response patterns that are repeated are more likely “true” than sequences that are not.  The model of 
Equation 7 might be criticized (justly, we think, given the fit of the simpler model) as “overfitting,” 
since it uses so many parameters.  However, we use this general model here for the purpose of 
investigating a specific hypothesis concerning its error rates.  In particular, we examine if error rates 
are smaller for choices with greater differences when the “true” order has been inferred for each 
person.  This allows examination of a particular hypothesis about deviations from the simpler model of 
Equation 6.
Error rates for more distant comparisons should be smaller according to transitive models such 
as those of Thurstone (1927) and Luce (1959), which can be deduced from the assumption that people 
choose the alternative with the higher momentary utility, where the utilities of the gambles contain 
random error.  Suppose the momentary utility of gamble G is given by
U(G) = u(G)+ eG (9)
where u(G) is the true utility of G and eG is a normally distributed “error” component with a mean of 
zero.  Suppose a person chooses the gamble with the higher momentary utility.  If so, then the 
probability of choosing A over B is the probability that U(A) > U(B).  If the errors are normally 












where s AB is the standard deviation of the difference eA - e B, and N is the cumulative normal 
distribution function.  According to this model, if the standard deviations of differences are equal, 13
s AB =s BC =s AC, then if  P(A,B) = 0.84 and P(B,C) = 0.84, then P(A,C)= 0.975.  Equation 10 is 
sometimes called “Thurstone’s law” of comparative judgment.  
Interpreted with respect to Equations 6 or 7, we have a “true” pattern of    A f Bf C where 
e1 = 0.16, e2 = 0.16, and e3 = 0.025.  That is, the rate of “error” on the AC choice should be smaller 
than and predictable from the rates of error on AB and BC, because the utility difference is the sum of 
the two differences, u(A) - u(C) = u(A)- u(B) +[u(B) - u(C)].  This shows that the random noise 
error model (Carbone & Hey, 2000: Hey, 2005; Hey & Orme, 1994) can be treated as a (transitive) 
special case of the most general “true and error” model used here. 
4 Methods of Studies 1-3
Participants chose between gambles by viewing the choices via the Internet and clicking a 
button beside the gamble in each choice they would rather play. Gambles were described in terms of 
containers holding 100 tickets from which one would be chosen at random to determine the prize. 
They were displayed as in the following example:
Which do you choose?
          A: 50 tickets to win $100
             50 tickets to win $0
      OR
          B: win $45 for sure 
There were 20 choices.  The first two assessed risk aversion. The other 18 were composed of 3 series 
of six choices each, each designed to test predictions of CRU and CDG.  Each series was composed of 
three choices testing transitivity with each choice counterbalanced for position (first or second 
gamble).  The 18 were intermixed with order restricted so that no two trials from the same group of 
three would appear on successive trials.  
Table 3 shows the lotteries of Series I, II, and III used in the first two studies. The difference 
between Trials 5 and 20 Trials 8 and 17, and Trials 11 and 14 is just the (first or second) positioning of 
lotteries. Consider Series I: Trial 5 was a choice between A = ($100, 0.5; $0) and B = ($50, 0.9; $0), in 14
Trial 8, B is compared with C = $37 for sure, and Trial 11 is a choice between C and A. In the notation 
of Table 1, a = $100, b = $50, and c = $37. Series II and III were the same as Series I, except b = $53, 
and c = $33 in Series II; and b = $55 and c = $30 in Series III.  
Insert Table 3 about here.
Three studies used different groups of participants.  Study 1 used 127 college undergraduates 
who performed the 20 choices twice, separated by four other intervening tasks that required about 20 
minutes.  These college students were tested in labs containing Internet-connected computers.  They 
participated as one option toward an assignment in lower division psychology. Of these, 54% were 
female; 87% were 20 years or younger, and no one was older than 26.
In Study 2, a second group of 162 participants was recruited via the Web; these participated 
with the understanding that one would be chosen to receive the prize of one of their 20 chosen 
gambles.  Of these 162, 66% were female; 35% were 20 years or less, and 15% were over 40.
Complete materials for Studies 1 and 2 can be examined at the following URLs:
http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/decisions/Schmidt_Ulli.htm
http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/decisions/Schmidt_Ulli_1.htm
For Study 3, a third group of 149 participants was recruited via the Web and tested using 
different choices for Series II and III.  Series I was the same, but Series II used b = $45, and c = $40; 
Series III used b = $43 and c = $38.  This widened our search for intransitive preferences predicted by 
the CRU or CDG models.  Of these 149, 68% were female, 20% were 20 years of age or less, and 19% 
were 40 years or older. Materials for Study 3 are available at the following URL:
http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/decisions/Schmidt_Ulli2.htm
5 Results of Studies 1-3
The percentages of people who chose the second gamble in each pair are shown in Table 3 for 
all three series.  If most people followed the predictions of CRU or CDG model, with the parameters 15
we assumed, the choice proportions should be less than 0.5 in the first three rows of Table 3 (Choices 
5, 8, and 11) and greater than 0.5 in the second three rows (Choices 20, 17, and 14) of the same table. 
Instead, we see that the majority prefers ($50, .9; $0) over ($100, .5; $0) in Choices 5 and 20, so the 
modal choices are transitive; similar results were obtained for b = $53 and $55 in Series II and III, 
respectively.
Table 4 shows the number of people who showed each pattern of preference on Choices 5, 8, 
and 11, on (reflected) Choices 20, 17, and 14, and on both of these sets of trials on Replicates 1 and 2 
of Series I.  Patterns 000 and 111 are intransitive; the other six patterns are transitive.  The pattern of 
violations predicted by CRU and CDG is 000, and the 111 pattern is consistent with the model of 
Bordley (1992). Only one person repeated the predicted pattern 000 of intransitivity in the first 
replicate and no one repeated this same pattern on both replicates of Series I. One person repeated the 
opposite intransitive pattern, 111, in both replicates of Series I.
Insert Table 4 about here.
Tables 5 and 6 show response patterns as in Table 4 for Series II and III, respectively.  Data 
from the Web recruits are shown in Table 7 for all three series.  Results in Tables 5, 6, and 7 are all 
quite similar to those in Table 4: very few people showed intransitive orders, and almost no one 
repeated intransitive patterns (only two in Table 5, two in Table 6, and four in Table 7). 
Insert Tables 5, 6, and 7 about here.
Table 8 shows how the data of Series I are partitioned for the fit of the true and error model. 
Data are partitioned into the number of people who showed each pattern repeatedly (both), and the 
average number who showed each pattern on either the first three choices of Table 3 or the second 
three choices of Table 3 (with positions reversed), but not both.  By construction, these 16 frequencies 
are mutually exclusive and sum to the number of participants (127). 
Insert Table 8 about here.16
When the true and error model is fit to the data of each replicate of each series separately, it is 
found that intransitive patterns are estimated to be low in probability, as one might expect from the 
small numbers who exhibited these patterns repeatedly. Parameter estimates for Replicates 1 and 2 of 
Series I are shown in Table 9.  According to the model, about 1% of the participants were intransitive. 
But the strictly transitive model provided satisfactory fits to the data.  Similar results (not shown) were 
obtained with Series II and III and for the Web data.
Insert Table 9 about here.
The Chi-Squares (indices of lack of fit) for unconstrained and transitive models are shown in 
Table 10. None of these values are significant.  The difference in fit between the transitive and free 
(allowing intransitivity) models is not significant in any of the 9 tests (a = 0.05), indicating that we 
can retain the hypothesis that no one was truly intransitive [P(000) = P(111) = 0] in Series I, II, III of 
Lab or Web data.                        Insert Table 10 about here.
Tables 11 and 12 show results for Study 3, which can be compared with Tables 3 and 7, 
respectively.  Study 3 used the same choices for Series I, where the modal preference pattern was 100 
in all three studies.  The modal choice pattern in Series II and III of Studies 1 and 2 was 101 in all four 
cases.  Study 3 used different choices in Series II and III, which changed the modal choice pattern to 
110; however, the rate of intransitivity remained quite low: only 1 person repeated the predicted 000 
pattern in Series II and III combined.        Insert Tables 11 and 12 about here.
The error terms (e1,e2,e3) can be estimated directly from the number who reverse preferences 
between repetitions.  This method may not be optimal to minimize the test statistic, but it has the 
advantage that the estimated error terms are independent of assumptions concerning transitivity. 
Between the first and second repetitions in Study 1, the average rate of agreement over all 20 choices 
was 85.6%.  Within replicates, the agreement between the same choices with the first-second position 
reversed was 88.5%.  The correlation between these two estimates of “error” over participants was 17
0.63, indicating individual differences in the error rate; some people have greater error rates than 
others.  With 87% agreement, there are 13% preference reversals [2e(1- e)], which corresponds to an 
average error rate, e = 0.07.
For Replicate 1 of Series I, there were 24 who reversed preferences between Choice 5 and 20, 
25 who reversed preferences between Choices 8 and 17, and only 9 who reversed preferences between 
Choices 11 and 14.  These correspond to error rates of e1 = 0.11, e2 = 0.11, and e3 = 0.04. These 
estimates assume nothing about transitivity.  With error rates fixed to these values, c
2 = 7.09 for the 
model with probabilities of all sequences free, and c
2 = 8.71 for the transitive model. The difference, 
1.6, is not significant.  Results for the other series and replicates yielded similar conclusions: the 
success of the transitive model does not depend on its freedom to estimate error rates to optimize fit to 
transitivity.
We can illustrate the power of these statistical tests by adding hypothetical participants who 
repeated the predicted 000 pattern.  We again fit data of Replicate 1 of Series I, holding the error rates 
fixed to the values estimated from observed preference reversals between replicates, while adding 0, 1, 
2, 3, 4, or 5 hypothetical cases who repeated the predicted 000 pattern. The c
2 values are 8.7, 13.44, 
21.9, 33.03, 46.07, and 60.47 for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 added cases, respectively. Had there been just three 
people who repeatedly showed the predicted pattern of CRU and CDG, we could have rejected the 
purely transitive model in favor of the hypothesis that 3% of people are truly intransitive.  When 
people are relatively consistent in their preferences, as they were in this study, estimated error rates are 
small, and the test statistic is very sensitive to cases where people show a repeated pattern violating the 
model. 
With the same data, we can also examine fit as a function of the proportion of assumed 
intransitive participants.  Recall that the best-fit solution indicated that both types of intransitivity 18
represent 1.4% of the participants, with c
2 = 7.09.  Assuming that this theoretical probability of 
intransitivity [p000 + p 111] is 0.05, 0.08, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, or 0.25, the corresponding c
2 are 8.9, 11.4, 
13.2, 18.3, 24.2, and 31.1.  Thus, this analysis shows that the data not only fail to show much evidence 
for intransitivity, they also allow us to reject the hypothesis that as much as 10% was intransitive.
The more general error model of Expressions 7 and 8 was applied to the data of Study 1 Series 
I. The maximum likelihood solution for each hypothesis was calculated for each participant, and these 
were used to boostrap the most probable Bayesian solution for each person. It was found that 
hypotheses 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, and 111 were most probably correct for 0, 33, 6, 3, 45, 
21, 18, and 1 participants, respectively.  The four most probable hypotheses coincide with those four 
patterns most often repeated as well as those four that were most probable in the group analysis. Only 
1 person was deemed probably intransitive by this analysis.  For the remaining 126 participants in 
Study 1, we can renumber the gambles for each person so that we can estimate error rates for the 
choice between the best two gambles, the worst two, and the choice between the best and worst for 
each person, respectively.  With this rearrangement, the average error rates are 0.14, 0.11, and 0.04, 
respectively.  Thus, average individual error rates are consistent with the hypothesis that error rates are 
smaller for gambles that are more distant, as predicted by the transitive models of Thurstone and Luce 
(Thurstone, 1927; Luce, 1959, 1994). 
This analysis was applied to the 306 Web data of Series I of Studies 2 and 3 who completed all 
choices in Series I.  In this case, there were 0, 67, 14, 7, 96, 49, 63, and 10 participants had highest 
Bayesian posterior probabilities for 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110 and 111, respectively. 
Rearranging the data for the 296 who appeared transitive, the three average error rates were 0.12, 0.04, 
and 0.02 for the errors choosing between the two best, worst two, and between best and worst.  Again, 
the average error rate is least for the choice that is most discrepant.  Despite the fact that the simpler 
error model provides an adequate fit to the data, these analyses suggest that deviations from that model 19
are systematic and consistent with the class of Thurstone models.
However, whichever of these error models is assumed, the data provide virtually no evidence 
that people are systematically intransitive for the choices we tested.  We found no significant 
violations of transitivity of the type predicted by CRU and CDG, nor did we find substantial violations 
of the opposite type (Bordley, 1992).  Satisfaction of transitivity does not rule out these models, of 
course, because these models could allow transitive preferences for this experiment with different 
parameters.  In other words, our results do not rule out intransitivity for choices not yet tested. 
Nevertheless, one author of this paper was also an author of the CRU and CDG models, and we did 
our best to find violations, if they were to be found. 
The CRU and CDG models had no historical record of claims of violations of transitivity. 
However, the additive difference models, including regret theory, have been at the center of a 
controversy concerning intransitivity.  In Studies 4 and 5, we apply the same experimental and 
analytical methods to the study of intransitivity predicted by regret theory, using choices that had been 
previously tested.
6 Additive Difference Models: Regret and Majority Rule
Regret theory and majority rule are both special cases of the additive difference model, which 
can be written as follows:
  
A f BÛ fi[a i
i=1
n
å ,bi]> 0 (9)
where    A f B denotes A is preferred to B, ai and bi are the subjective values of the consequences of A 
and B for state of the world i, and the function fi maps a contrast on this state of the world (or 
dimension) into a preference between the gambles.  
According to regret theory (Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Bell, 1982), people compare the prizes 
for each state of the world and make choices in order to minimize the regret.  For example, suppose 20
that regrets are given by the following expression:
fi[ai, bi] = pi(xi - yi)
3 (10)
where pi is the probability that state of the world i occurs; xi  and yi are the cash payoffs of A and B in 
this state of the world, respectively.  Note that in this case, large differences in payoff produce 
particularly large regrets, as proposed by regret theory. Note as well that the cubic function retains the 
signs (directions) of the regrets. 
Consider Choices 11, 5, and 13 of Table 13.  These were used in by Loomes, Starmer, and 
Sugden (1991) and produced the greatest percentage of predicted intransitive cycles (28%, see p. 437). 
In addition, this set was chosen because the observed incidence of this intransitive cycle exceeded the 
frequency of the most common transitive cycle that differed from it by only one choice.  According to 
Equations 9 and 10,  fi[bi å ,ci]= –8.3, so    C f B;  fi[ai å , bi] = –18.7, so    B f A; however, 
fi[ai å , ci]= 45.2, so    A f C , violating transitivity.         
Insert Table 13 about here.
The majority rule model (sometimes called the most probable winner model) is also a special 
case of Equation 1 in which the contrast functions are as follows:
  
fi ai, bi [ ] =
pi,ai f bi





According to this model, people should prefer A to B (it has higher values on two of the three 
dimensions), they should prefer B to C, and C to A, for the same reasons.  Thus, majority rule also 
predicts violations of transitivity, but of the opposite pattern from that predicted by regret theory. [In 
this case,  fi[ai å , bi] = 0.4,  fi[bi å ,ci]= 0.4, yet  fi[ai å , ci]= -0.2; therefore,    A f B,    B f C, but 
   C f A.]
A problem in previous empirical tests of regret theory is that a number of confounds were 21
present in those studies (Humphrey, 2001; Starmer & Sugden, 1993; 1998).  Probably the most 
important problem was that different forms of the gambles were used in different choices.  A and B 
were presented for comparison as three-branch gambles (as illustrated in Choice 11, 
A = ($10,0.4; $3,0.3;$3,0.3),  B = ($7.5,0.4;$7.5,0.3;$1,0.3)).  However, the so-called choice 
between B and C was presented in a form in which the two upper branches of  ¢  B  and  ¢  C  were 
coalesced ( ¢  B  = ($7.5,0.7;$1,0.3),  ¢  C  =($5,0.7; $5,0.3)). The so-called choice between 
C = ($5,0.4;$5,0.3; $5,0.3) and A was presented with the two lower branches of  ¢  ¢  C   and  ¢  ¢  A   
coalesced ( ¢  ¢  C  = ($5,0.4;$5,0.6), ¢  ¢  A  =($10,0.4; $6,0.3) ).  According to the transitive, TAX model 
(e.g., Birnbaum & Navarrete, 1998), with parameters estimated from previous data, the splitting and 
coalescing of branches could account for apparent violations of transitivity. According to TAX, U(A) 
= 4.33, U(B) = 5.33; U(C) = 5.00; U( ¢  B ) = 3.79; U( ¢  C ) = 5.00, U( ¢  ¢  A ) = 5.01; U( ¢  ¢  C ) = 5.00.  Thus, 
this TAX model implies that    A p B,   ¢  B  p ¢  C , and   ¢  ¢  A  f ¢  ¢  C  .
In this paper, we keep all gambles in the same three-branch form to remove this confound with 
event splitting.  Starmer & Sugden (1998) and Humphrey (2001) recognized this confound and 
controlled for it by presenting the choices in fully split forms or by using a different format for display 
(“strip”) in which gambles could be presented in fully coalesced form. But those articles had a second 
problem; namely, they used asymmetry of different types of intransitivity as evidence of intransitivity. 
As noted in Section 3, such asymmetry is entirely compatible with an error model in which people 
make occasional “errors” in reporting their preferences, even if everyone is truly transitive.
7 Methods of Studies 4 and 5
Study 4 was conducted with undergraduates enrolled in lower division psychology at 
California State University at Fullerton (USA). Gambles were described in terms of a container 
holding 100 tickets numbered from #1 to #100, from which one would be chosen at random to 
determine the prize. The relationship between tickets and prizes was displayed in the matrix format 22
shown in Figure 1, which illustrates the payoffs for states of the world in three of the choices used. 
Participants viewed 15 choices via the Internet and indicated their choices by clicking the button 
beside the gamble they would rather play.  They were informed that at the end of the study, 10 people 
would be chosen randomly who would receive the prize of one of their chosen gambles.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
There were 15 choices in the study.  The first three assessed risk aversion in two-branch gambles and 
served as a warm-up. There were two replications of three choices each. Position of the two gambles 
in each pair was counterbalanced between the two replications (Table 13).  The difference between 
Choices 11 and 13, for example, is first or second positioning of the gambles in the choice.  These six 
choices were alternated with six filler trials. In Series I, A = ($10, 0.4; $3, 0.3; $3, 0.3), B = ($7.5, .4; 
$7.5, .3; $1, .3), C = ($5, 0.4; $5, 0.3; $5, 0.3)           Insert Table 13 about here.
The 314 college undergraduates were tested either in labs containing Internet-connected 
computers or via the Internet at times and using computers of participants’ own choosing.  They 
participated as one option toward an assignment in lower division psychology. Of these, 60.5% were 
female; 92% were 21 years or younger, and 1% were older than 26.
Complete materials can be examined at the following URL:
http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/decisions/Loomes_table.htm
Study 5 was conducted at the University of Hannover (Germany) with 103 undergraduate 
economics and management students.  Format of gambles and choices were the same as in Study 4, 
except the materials were printed on paper and presented in a classroom setting. Participants marked 
their choices in pencil and received a flat payment of 5 Euro. There were 15 choices, including the six 
choices used in Study 4 (Table 13), three filler choices, plus a second series of six choices to test 
transitivity. In Series II, A = ($18, 0.3; $0, 0.3; $0, 0.4), B = ($8, 0.3; $8, 0.3; $0, 0.4), and C = ($4, 
0.3; $4, 0.3; $4, 0.4). Series II were previously used by Starmer & Sugden (1998), leading to relatively 23
high rates of asymmetry. 
8 Results of Studies 4 and 5
The percentages choosing the second gamble in each choice are displayed in Table 13.  The 
observed frequencies for response patterns of Series I of Studies 4 and 5 are presented in Table 14, 
with results from Starmer and Sugden (1998) included for comparison.  However, whereas Starmer & 
Sugden (1998) observed 20% showing the intransitive pattern 111, we found in Study 1 only 8% and 
7%, who showed this pattern on Choices #11, 5, and 13, on # 9, 15, and 7, respectively; only 0.6% 
showed this pattern on both repetitions. 
In Study 5, this intransitive pattern was observed with relative frequencies of 6% (#11, 5, and 
13), 6% (# 9, 15, and 7), and 3% (both repetitions). In the choices of Table 15 the intransitive pattern 
111 is observed even less often, i.e. 3% (#6, 10, 14), 3% (#4, 12, 8), and 2% (both repetitions), 
compared to 11% in Starmer and Sugden (1998).  Insert Tables 14 and 15 about here.
Tables 16 and 17 show how error rates in each choice are estimated from preference reversals 
between repetitions of the same choices.  The three rows in Table 16 show responses to choices 
between A and B, B and C, and C and A, respectively.  The Chi-Square test of independence assesses 
whether the probability of choice combinations can be represented by the product of probabilities for 
individual choices.  These tests are all significant, violating independence.  The Chi-Square tests of the 
true and error model (also with 1 df), however, are all nonsignificant, indicating that the true and error 
model can be retained for these data. 
Insert Tables 16 and 17 about here.
The error rates are estimated from preference reversals between repeated presentations of the 
same choice with position of the gambles reversed.  In Study 4, these were estimated to be 0.13, 0.16, 
and 0.14 for the three choices (AB, BC, CA), respectively.  In Study 5, the corresponding values were 
0.08, 0.14, and 0.13 for the first set of gambles and 0.02, 0.04, and 0.05 for the second set (Table 14). 24
Recall that these estimates of error rates assume nothing about transitivity.
Tables 18, 19, and 20 show the fit of the “true and error” model to the observed frequencies, 
using error rates estimated from replications.  This model was fit with the probabilities of intransitive 
patterns freely estimated or with these parameters set to zero.  The purely transitive model gave a good 
approximation to the data of Study 4, and deviations of fit are not significant, c
2(12) = 14.3.  When 
all parameters were free, the fit was only slightly improved, and the estimated rate of intransitivity of 
both types was 3%. This improvement in fit was not significant, c
2(2) = 2.85.  Therefore, we can 
retain the hypothesis that everyone was transitive in Study 4.
Insert Tables 18, 19, and 20 about here.
In Study 5, the fit of the true and error model to the data in Table 19 yielded c
2(10) = 4.53. 
However, the fit of the purely transitive model was worse, c
2(12) = 23.72, which suggests that the 7% 
estimated incidence of intransitivity can be considered significantly greater than zero.  Fitting the true 
and error model to the second set, in Table 20, the value of c
2(12) = 2.19, again indicating acceptable 
fit.  With the probabilities of both intransitive patterns set to zero, c
2(10) = 36.0, which is again 
significant.  This analysis indicates that the estimated rate of 2% intransitivity is “significant,” relative 
to the small error rates in Table 17.  With the paper and pencil method, people can easily check for 
consistency between repetitions of the same choice, so these error rates might be lower than they 
would have been had memory been required to reproduce identical choices. 
9 Summary and Conclusions
The success of transitivity in our data is compatible with findings of Birnbaum and Gutierrez 
(2006), who tested violations of transitivity predicted by a lexicographic semi-order and studied by 
Tversky (1969). Brandstaetter, et al. (2006) noted that their priority heuristic model implies that the 
majority of people should systematically violate transitivity with Tversky’s choices.  As in the present 25
data, however, Birnbaum and Gutierrez also found very few cases of repeated intransitivity, contrary 
to the conclusions of Tversky (1969) and Brandstaetter, et al. (2006).1  With the Tversky gambles, 
Birnbaum and Gutierrez found that the vast majority of data that were internally consistent (where 
people agreed with their own choices between repetitions) followed the transitive order matching 
expected value, TAX, and other transitive models.  Interestingly, this consensus among people 
occurred despite the fact that Tversky’s gambles were designed to have nearly identical expected 
values.  
These data show greater individual differences among people for their transitive orders than 
found by Birnbaum and Gutierrez.  There are four popular transitive patterns in our Studies 1-3: 001, 
100, 101, and 110.  In those studies there is a sure thing, a highly probable prize and a medium 
probability prize.  The Tversky gambles, in contrast, included no sure thing; perhaps these individual 
differences in Studies 1-3 arise because of this feature of our study.  Although people disagreed with 
each other, people were fairly consistent with their own choices in this study.  Participants agreed with 
their own judgments 87% of the time on average.  In Birnbaum (1999), the lab sample agreed 82% of 
the time between replicates. Perhaps our higher internal consistency was facilitated by many 
repetitions of the same or similar choices Study 1-2. 
Loomes, Starmer & Sugden (1989), (1991) and Starmer & Sugden (1998) found that the 
pattern of intransitivity predicted by regret theory was more frequent than the opposite pattern.  As 
noted above, their asymmetric intransitivites might have resulted from response errors, event-splitting 
effects, or other complications, rather than from “real” intransitivity (Humphrey, 2001; Sopher & 
Gigliotti, 1993; Starmer & Sugden, 1998).  Our attempts to replicate these studies yielded data that did 
not show systematic intransitivity; in fact, neither our German nor American samples showed the 
1 Although the model of Brandstaetter, et al. (in press) model is not always transitive, it does not predict violations of 
transitivity in any of these studies.  In Studies 1-3 it predicts that majority choices should exhibit the transitive order, 
 in all three series, whereas the observed modal choices in Series II and III are .  In Study 4, this 
model predicts    C f A f B , in agreement with the most frequently repeated pattern.  In Study 5 Series II, it predicts 
   C f A f B, which was repeated by only 1 person; instead, the modal pattern was    C f B f A .  26
asymmetry previously reported. 
Blavatskyy (2003) reported a large incidence of violations of transitivity using lotteries that fit 
the structure of Table 1.  He postulated a heuristic of relative probability comparison (see also 
Blavatskyy, 2006).  In his experiments, about 55% of subjects indeed exhibited these cycles. However, 
his study is difficult to compare with ours because lotteries were represented by natural frequencies in 
a sample of nine previous observations, without any specified probability information.  His form of 
presentation may well be crucial to the effect he reported.  We found very few people who repeated 
the pattern predicted by that model in Studies 4 and 5.
The CDG and CRU models, as described here, account for standard paradoxes but they do not 
account for the “new paradoxes” described by Birnbaum (1999; 2004a; 2004b; 2005a; 2005b).  They 
have in common that “sure things” introduce additional considerations to risky decision making that 
can create intransitivity. Had the predicted pattern of intransitivity been observed, we would have been 
able to refute a large class of transitive utility models, including Birnbaum’s transfer of attention 
exchange (TAX) model, which accounts for the new paradoxes.  This would have encouraged us to 
revise CDG and CRU theories to explain those phenomena or to revise TAX to incorporate, for 
example, reference levels that depend on the best lowest consequence, in order to account for 
intransitive preference.  
Similarly, had either regret model or the majority rule model been successful in predicting 
systematic patterns of intransitivity, it would have been a strong point in favor of one of these models. 
Although they make opposite predictions, some theoreticians find the intuitions of both models 
appealing.  Why not choose the gamble that most often gives the best outcome?  Why not choose the 
gamble that one would least regret?  But the data do not confirm these intuitions: we found few cases 
where participants repeated an intransitive pattern.  Combining these data with those of Birnbaum and 
Gutierrez for the lexicographic semiorder, we think the burden of proof should shift to those who 27
would argue that intransitive models are descriptive of more than two or three percent of the 
population.
 In summary, we tested for violations of transitivity where predicted by four models with 
parameters chosen to explain common findings.  When data are analyzed using an error model in 
which different people can have different “true” preference patterns, but vary in their responses to the 
same choices due to “errors,” we find little evidence to refute the hypothesis that everyone had a 
transitive preference order.28
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Table 1.  Design of Lotteries used to test transitivity in Studies 1-3.
Lottery p q 1 – p – q
A a 0 0
B b b 0
C c c c
Note: a > b > c> 0.35
Table 2. Patterns of Choice.  
Notation Preference Pattern Preference Order
000    A f B; B f C;C f A Intransitive
001    A f B; B f C;C p A    A f Bf C
010    A f B; B p C;C f A    C f A f B
011    A f B; B p C;C p A    A f C f B
100    A p B; B f C;C f A    B f C f A
101    A p B; B f C;C p A    B f C f A
110    A p B; B p C;C f A    C f B f A
111    A p B; B p C;C p A Intransitive
The pattern predicted by CRU and CDU is 000.36
Table 3. Tests of transitivity, showing trial numbers for Series I. 
Choice % Second Gamble










A: 50 to win $100
   50 to win $0 
B: 90 to win $b
   10 to win $0
67 70 70
BC 8
B: 90 to win $b
   10 to win $0
C: $c for sure 33 28 23
CA 11 C: $c for sure A: 50 to win $100
   50 to win $0
48 58 57
BA 20 B: 90 to win $b
   10 to win $0
A: 50 to win $100
   50 to win $0
33 31 27
CB 17 C:  $c for sure B: 90 to win $b
   10 to win $0
70 79 76
AC 14 A: 50 to win $100
   50 to win $0
C: $c for sure 51 44 39
Note that Trials 5, 8, and 11 are the same as 20, 17, and 14, respectively, but counterbalanced for 
position. Trial numbers apply to Series I only.  Predicted pattern of intransitivity is    A f Bf C f A for 
CRU and CDU.37
 Table 4.  Response Patterns for Series I. 
First Rep Second Rep First and 
Second
Pattern #5,8,11 #20, 17, 14 Both #5,8,11 #20, 17, 14 Both Combined
000 2 4 1 2 2 0 0
001 20 20 10 35 26 23 8
010 6 7 5 7 10 6 4
011 8 9 5 4 6 3 3
100 35 35 25 30 36 26 15
101 27 30 16 19 24 14 7
110 22 18 13 28 18 15 7
111 7 4 1 2 5 2 1
Total 127 127 76 127 127 89 45
Responses to trials #20, 17, and 14 have been reflected to correct for the counterbalancing of position. 
Only 1 person showed the predicted pattern of intransitivity on both Choices 5, 8, and 11, and 20, 17, 
and 14 in the First replicate.  However, 25 repeated the transitive pattern,    B f C f A. 38
Table 5.  Response patterns for Series II.  Each entry is the number of participants who showed each 
choice combination. 
First Rep Second Rep First and 
Second
Pattern #10,4,7 #19,15,13 Both #10,4,7 #19,15,13 Both Combined
000 2 1 0 3 1 1 0
001 24 23 16 31 32 26 11
010 5 5 4 5 7 4 3
011 5 9 3 2 2 0 0
100 27 36 20 21 32 20 15
101 41 39 29 35 36 28 17
110 17 13 9 26 16 15 5
111 6 1 1 4 1 0 0
Total 127 127 82 127 127 94 5139
Table 6.  Response patterns in Series III. 
First Rep Second Rep First and 
Second
Pattern #6,3,12 #18,9,15 Both #6,3,12 #18,9,15 Both Combined
000 2 0 0 2 1 1 0
001 25 24 15 33 27 23 12
010 5 5 3 5 5 4 3
011 4 7 2 1 3 1 1
100 34 26 24 24 25 20 14
101 39 44 30 37 46 33 21
110 14 19 13 23 19 17 9
111 4 2 1 2 1 0 0
Total 127 127 88 127 127 99 6040
Table 7.  Response patterns in Web participants of Study 2.
Series I Series II Series III
Pattern #5, 8, 11 #20, 17, 14 Both #10, 4, 7 #19, 15,13 Both #6, 3, 12 #18, 9,15 Both
000 2 4 0 1 2 0 4 0 0
001 20 25 14 30 30 21 22 24 18
010 11 8 5 9 7 4 6 8 3
011 8 7 4 8 5 0 5 5 2
100 44 37 31 36 37 25 37 36 28
101 37 36 24 46 50 35 59 59 48
110 31 35 24 23 21 14 19 19 13
111 7 8 3 7 8 1 7 8 1
Total 160 160 105 160 160 100 159 159 113
Notes: Each choice was repeated only with position counterbalanced. Totals do not sum to number of 
participants (162) due to occasional skipped items.41
Table 8.  Data partitioned into conjunction and union excluding conjunction (Series I).  





000 1 2 0 2
001 10 10 23 7.5
010 5 1.5 6 2.5
011 5 3.5 3 2
100 25 10 26 7
101 16 12.5 14 7.5
110 13 7 15 8
111 1 4.5 2 1.5
Total 76 51 89 38
These are the data to which the model is fit, to minimize the Chi-Square between predicted and 
obtained frequencies.  The 16 entries must sum to the number of participants, so there are 15 df in the 
data.42
Table 9. Parameters estimated from true and error model (Series I).
First Rep #5,8,11 and #20, 
17, 14
Second Rep # 5, 8, 11 and 20, 
17, 14.
Pattern Full Model Transitive Full Model Transitive
000 0.006 (0) 0.000 (0)
001 0.154 0.170 0.265 0.264
010 0.055 0.057 0.063 0.069
011 0.064 0.063 0.029 0.021
100 0.313 0.315 0.288 0.285
101 0.239 0.214 0.163 0.203
110 0.160 0.181 0.173 0.158
111 0.009 (0) 0.020 (0)
c
2 6.51 7.60 3.15 8.57
Values are estimates of probability of each “true” preference pattern.  Values in parentheses are fixed. 
Estimated error terms are .09, .08, and .10 in the first repetition, and .10, .08, and 0 in the second 
repetition. Although one or two people may have been systematically intransitive in Series I, a good fit 
is still obtained when we assume there were no intransitive participants.43
Table 10. Chi-Squares indices of (lack of) fit for transitive model and unconstrained model. 
Data Set
Model (df)
Transitive (7) All Free (5) Difference (2)
Series I rep 1 7.60 6.51 1.08
Series I rep 2 8.57 3.15 5.42
Series II rep 1 4.42 4.13 0.30
Series II rep 2 5.05 2.16 2.88
Series III rep 1 6.45 5.16 1.30
Series III rep 2 4.84 2.87 1.97
Series I Web 8.50 2.58 5.92
Series II Web 3.72 3.72 0.00
Series III Web 3.45 3.30 0.15
Notes: Critical values of Chi-Square with 7, 5, and 2 df are 14.1, 11.1, and 6.0 for a = 0.05, 
respectively. None of the values are significant, indicating that the transitive model provides a 
satisfactory description of the data.44
Table 11. Tests of transitivity in Study 3 (n = 149).  Series II and III used different values from those 
in Study1. 
Choice % Second Gamble










A: 50 to win $100
   50 to win $0 
B: 90 to win $b
   10 to win $0
70 62 57
BC 8
B: 90 to win $b
   10 to win $0
C: $c for sure 37 65 61
CA 11 C: $c for sure A: 50 to win $100
   50 to win $0
46 32 42
BA 20 B: 90 to win $b
   10 to win $0
A: 50 to win $100
   50 to win $0
33 41 44
CB 17 C:  $c for sure B: 90 to win $b
   10 to win $0
60 34 38
AC 14 A: 50 to win $100
   50 to win $0
C: $c for sure 54 66 60
Note that Trials 5, 8, and 11 are the same as 20, 17, and 14, respectively, but counterbalanced for 
position. Trial numbers apply to Series I only.  45
Table 12.  Response patterns in Web participants of Study 3. 
Series I Series II Series III
Pattern #5, 8, 11 #20, 17, 14 Both #10, 4, 7 #19, 15,13 Both #6, 3, 12 #18, 9,15 Both
000 2 2 0 3 3 1 6 1 0
001 26 26 20 18 18 13 22 23 15
010 14 11 8 16 18 12 14 17 9
011 3 9 3 19 22 14 21 24 14
100 32 37 26 25 26 15 23 24 14
101 31 22 16 5 3 1 7 8 4
110 32 31 23 57 51 45 42 45 31
111 6 8 3 5 7 1 12 5 2
Total 146 146 99 148 148 102 147 147 89
Notes: Each choice was repeated only with position counterbalanced. Totals do not sum to number of 
participants (n = 149) due to occasional skipped items.46
Table 13. Tests of Transitivity used in Studies 4 and 5 (Series I).
Choice N = 314 N = 103






AB 11 40 to win 10
30 to win 3
30 to win 3
40 to win 7.5
30 to win 7.5
30 to win 1
34 36 90
BC 5 40 to win 7.5
30 to win 7.5
30 to win 1
40 to win 5
30 to win 5
30 to win 5
64 52 46
CA 13 40 to win 5
30 to win 5
30 to win 5
40 to win 10
30 to win 3
30 to win 3
47 56 20
BA 9 40 to win 7.5
30 to win 7.5
30 to win 1
40 to win 10
30 to win 3
30 to win 3
66 59 10
CB 15 40 to win 5
30 to win 5
30 to win 5
40 to win 7.5
30 to win 7.5
30 to win 1
41 49 53
AC 7 40 to win 10
30 to win 3
30 to win 3
40 to win 5
30 to win 5
30 to win 5
55 44 79
Enties show the percentage choosing the second gamble in each choice. In Series I, A = ($10, 0.4; $3, 
0.3; $3, 0.3), B = ($7.5, .4; $7.5, .3; $1, .3), C = ($5, 0.4; $5, 0.3; $5, 0.3).  In Series II, A = ($18, 0.3; 
$0, 0.3; $0, 0.4), B = ($8, 0.3; $8, 0.3; $0, 0.4), and C = ($4, 0.3; $4, 0.3; $4, 0.4).47




Study 4,  n = 314 Study 5, n = 103
Pattern #11, 5, 13 #9, 15, 7 Both #11, 5, 13 #9, 15, 7 Both
000 6 20 27 4 7 6 2
001 7 45 48 27 22 20 15
010 15 90 89 55 16 16 11
011 16 53 43 12 21 19 11
100 8 23 27 10 11 11 5
101 7 25 28 10 9 13 5
110 14 32 29 9 11 12 5
111 17 25 22 2 6 6 3
Total 90 313 313 129 103 103 57
Responses to trials #9, 15, and 7 have been reflected to correct for the counterbalancing of position. 
Regret theory implies the 111 pattern, and majority rule implies the 000 pattern of violations of 
transitivity.48
Table 15. Response Patterns in the Study 5 Series II.
Pattern Starmer & 
Sugden 
(1998)
#6, 10, 14 #4, 12, 8 Both
000 3 2 0 0
001 5 5 6 5
010 4 2 3 1
011 2 1 1 1
100 9 37 37 31
101 12 12 12 9
110 45 41 41 37
111 10 3 3 2
Total 90 103 103 86
Responses to #4, 12, and 8 have been reflected for comparability.49
Table 16. Preference Reversals between Repetitions (Study 4)





XY XX XY YX YY CHISQ_In
dep
p e CHISQ_TE
AB 171 37 36 69 71.56 0.277 0.135 0.01
BC 79 34 51 150 59.14 0.667 0.164 3.38
CA 132 34 41 107 84.91 0.445 0.139 0.65
Totals do not always sum to the number of participants (314) due to a skipped item.
Table 17. Preference Reversals between Repetitions (Study 5) 





XY XX XY YX YY CHISQ_In
dep
p e CHISQ_TE
AB 56 10 5 32 49.96 0.36 0.08 1.63
BC 37 12 13 41 27.21 0.53 0.14 0.04
AC 33 12 12 46 28.54 0.59 0.13 0.00
A’B’ 8 2 2 91 62.42 0.92 0.02 0.00
B’C’ 52 4 3 44 76.79 0.46 0.04 0.14
A’C’ 77 5 4 17 55.77 0.18 0.05 0.1150
Table 18.  Fit of Purely Transitive Model to Observed Frequencies (Study 4).
Observed Data Predicted  Est.





000 20 27 4 4 19.5 3.4 23.8 0.00
001 45 48 27 27 19.5 25.0 24.0 0.20
010 90 89 55 55 34.5 52.0 38.2 0.42
011 53 43 12 12 36 15.6 28.6 0.11
100 23 27 10 10 15 9.8 14.2 0.07
101 25 28 10 10 16.5 11.4 16.5 0.09
110 32 29 9 9 21.5 10.1 21.4 0.07
111 25 22 2 2 21.5 5.0 13.9 0.03
Total 313 313 129 129 184 132.4 180.6
The error terms were estimated from replications only.  The best-fit values are 0.13, 0.16, and 0.14 for 
Choices #11 and 9, #5 and 15, and #13 and 7, respectively.  For the transitive model, the value of 
c
2(10) = 14.3, which is not significant.  Allowing intransitivity, the estimated proportion of 
intransitive participants was .03; the fit was slightly improved,c
2(12) = 11.4, a nonsignificant 
improvement, c
2(2) = 2.85.51
Table 19.  Fit of True and Error Model to Observed Frequencies (Study 5, first series)
N = 103 Observed Data Predicted  Est.





000 7 6 2 2 4.5 1.7 6.1 0.02
001 22 20 15 15 6 12.6 8.9 0.26
010 16 16 11 11 5 9.3 7.5 0.19
011 21 19 11 11 9 9.3 9.1 0.18
100 11 11 5 5 6 5.4 5.0 0.11
101 9 13 5 5 6 4.7 5.6 0.09
110 11 12 5 5 6.5 5.1 5.4 0.10
111 6 6 3 3 3 2.7 4.8 0.05
Total 103 103 57 57 46 50.7 52.3
Index of fit is c
2(10) = 4.53.  The estimated “true” rate of intransitivity is 7%.  52
Table 20.  Fit of True and Error Model to Observed Frequencies (Study 5, series II)
Data as of 5-24-06 n = 103 Observed Data Predicted  Est.





000 2 0 0 0 1 0.0 1.0 0.00
001 5 6 5 5 0.5 4.7 0.8 0.06
010 2 3 1 1 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.01
011 1 1 1 1 0 0.9 0.4 0.01
100 37 37 31 31 6 31.0 5.2 0.37
101 12 12 9 9 3 8.8 2.8 0.10
110 41 41 37 37 4 35.7 5.2 0.43
111 3 3 2 2 1 1.9 2.5 0.02
Total 103 103 86 86 17 84.1 18.9
Index of fit is c
2(10) = 2.19 with estimated “true” intransitivites of 2%.53
 Figure 1.  Appearance of three choices in the browser (Study 1).  All gambles were presented as three 
branch gambles using states of the world, matrix format. In Study 2, the materials were printed on 
paper and participants marked their preferred choices in pencil.